@tasklite/mcp
TaskLite MCP server: build a full backend (projects, boards, data, REST endpoints), deploy a frontend onto it, and get a ready-made admin, from Claude Code and other MCP clients
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What changed
Changed 2026-11-12 15:20 UTC
5 descriptions rewritten, 2 schema or annotation changes with the description left byte-identical, 11 tools added.
--- pinned/build_backend +++ observed/build_backend { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, + "phoneColumns": { + "description": "mode \"phone\" only, optional, next to phoneColumn: more phone columns of the same board, up to 5 in all together with phoneColumn. A row is reachable by a caller whose verified phone is in ANY of them; use it for a second manager phone per row. A POST or PATCH body may not write any phone column (400); only the owner of the app sets them in TaskLite. The NAMES of columns of this board in the spec", + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "maxItems": 5, + "type": "array" + }, "relationColumn": { "description": "mode \"relation\" only, required there: a RELATION column on this endpoint's board. A row belongs to the caller when this column points at an item that stands for the caller (or, with viaColumn, at an item that points at one). Example: on the Trainees board, the \"Coach\" column. The NAME of a relation column of this board in the spec", "type": "string"
--- pinned/create_app_endpoint +++ observed/create_app_endpoint { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Expose a board as a REST endpoint of an app: /apps/{appSlug}/api/{slug}. exposedColumns limits which columns are readable/writable. rowLevelSecurity.enabled makes the endpoint per-user: the developer's server sends `X-App-User: <their user id>` next to the API key, and the endpoint returns, updates and deletes ONLY that user's rows (401 without the header). Use it whenever the app has its own users. rowLevelSecurity.mode chooses which rows a user reaches: owner (the rows they created), shared (all rows, for authorized users), phone (the rows that carry their verified phone) or relation (the rows linked through a relation column to the row that stands for them). An app with two kinds of people in one organization, coaches and their trainees, is built from these: the Coaches board in mode phone (phoneColumn = its phone column), so each coach reads and edits his own row; Trainees in mode relation with relationColumn = its Coach column and identityPhoneColumn = the Coaches phone column, so a coach who signed in by phone sees only his trainees; boards one hop further (weigh-ins of a trainee) in mode relation with relationColumn = the Trainee column and viaColumn = Trainees.Coach for the coach, plus a second endpoint on the same board without viaColumn for the trainee herself. A trainee becomes her row through an invite code (create_app_invite, or allowInvites so the coach mints it in the app) or link_app_user.", + "description": "Expose a board as a REST endpoint of an app: /apps/{appSlug}/api/{slug}. exposedColumns limits which columns are readable/writable. rowLevelSecurity.enabled makes the endpoint per-user: the developer's server sends `X-App-User: <their user id>` next to the API key, and the endpoint returns, updates and deletes ONLY that user's rows (401 without the header). Use it whenever the app has its own users. rowLevelSecurity.mode chooses which rows a user reaches: owner (the rows they created), shared (all rows, for authorized users), phone (the rows that carry their verified phone) or relation (the rows linked through a relation column to the row that stands for them). An app with two kinds of people in one organization, coaches and their trainees, is built from these: the Coaches board in mode phone (phoneColumn = its phone column), so each coach reads and edits his own row; Trainees in mode relation with relationColumn = its Coach column and identityPhoneColumn = the Coaches phone column, so a coach who signed in by phone sees only his trainees; boards one hop further (weigh-ins of a trainee) in mode relation with relationColumn = the Trainee column and viaColumn = Trainees.Coach for the coach, plus a second endpoint on the same board without viaColumn for the trainee herself. A trainee becomes her row through an invite code (create_app_invite, or allowInvites so the coach mints it in the app) or link_app_user. In mode phone, rowLevelSecurity.phoneColumns adds more phone columns (up to 5 with phoneColumn): the row is reachable by a caller whose verified phone is in any of them, e.g. a second manager phone per row. Bodies of POST and PATCH may not write a phone column; only the owner sets them. The answer may carry `warnings`, e.g. an exposed formula column whose input columns are not exposed (add them, readOnly is fine, or its value comes back null).", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" }, + "phoneColumns": { + "description": "mode \"phone\" only, optional, next to phoneColumn: more phone columns of the same board, up to 5 in all together with phoneColumn. A row is reachable by a caller whose verified phone is in ANY of them; use it for a second manager phone per row. A POST or PATCH body may not write any phone column (400); only the owner of the app sets them in TaskLite. Column ids (get_board_schema)", + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "maxItems": 5, + "type": "array" + }, "relationColumn": { "description": "mode \"relation\" only, required there: a RELATION column on this endpoint's board. A row belongs to the caller when this column points at an item that stands for the caller (or, with viaColumn, at an item that points at one). Example: on the Trainees board, the \"Coach\" column. A column id (get_board_schema)", "type": "string"
--- pinned/create_column +++ observed/create_column { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Add a typed column to a board. Valid types: text, rich_text, number, status, date, datetime, duration, people, checkbox, dropdown, label, priority, link, email, phone, relation, lookup, rollup, formula, rating, currency, file. Choose by meaning, date for dates, phone for phones, number/currency for amounts, dropdown/status (with settings.options as an array of labels) for closed choices; text is for free text only. An obvious name/type mismatch is rejected with the suggested type; pass force:true to override. Rules go in settings.validation: { unique, min, max, minLength, maxLength, pattern, patternMessage }, enforced on every write (UI, MCP, App API). Closed choices (dropdown/status) reject values outside settings.options unless settings.allowCustom is true.", + "description": "Add a typed column to a board. Valid types: text, rich_text, number, status, date, datetime, duration, people, checkbox, dropdown, label, priority, link, email, phone, relation, lookup, rollup, formula, rating, currency, file. Choose by meaning, date for dates, phone for phones, number/currency for amounts, dropdown/status (with settings.options as an array of labels) for closed choices; text is for free text only. An obvious name/type mismatch is rejected with the suggested type; pass force:true to override. Rules go in settings.validation: { unique, min, max, minLength, maxLength, pattern, patternMessage }, enforced on every write (UI, MCP, App API). Closed choices (dropdown/status) reject values outside settings.options unless settings.allowCustom is true. Sensitive identifiers (an Israeli ID number, a passport or account number) go in a sealed text column: settings.sealed: { normalize: \"il_id\" | \"digits\" | \"text\" }, usually with settings.validation.unique. The App API then stores only a keyed server-side fingerprint (hmac:v1:<hex>, under a secret key of the organization that never reaches the browser) and returns that on read; the page sends the plain value and must not hash it itself. A GET with filter[field]=<plain value> (eq, ne, in, empty) finds the row, a duplicate POST is refused with VALUE_NOT_UNIQUE, an invalid ID with INVALID_IL_ID. Every other write path (set_cell, create_item, the UI) refuses a plain value there (SEALED_COLUMN), and a column that already holds plain values cannot be sealed: create a new one. Formula column: settings.formula, e.g. { formula: \"{Unit price} * {Qty}\" }. Columns of the same row are written {Column Name} or {column-id} (a } inside a name is }; with two columns of one name use the id). Operators: + - * / %, brackets, comparison = != <> < <= >= , logic AND OR NOT; numbers, text in \"double\" or 'single' quotes, TRUE and FALSE (a true/false result is 1 / 0). Functions (not case sensitive): IF(cond, a, b), MIN, MAX, SUM, ROUND(x, digits), CEIL(x, step), FLOOR(x, step), ABS, COALESCE or IFBLANK, CONCAT, AND, OR, NOT. A blank cell counts as 0 in arithmetic; lookup and rollup columns can be read, and a lookup with several values must go through SUM, MIN, MAX or COALESCE. A formula that does not parse, names an unknown column or reads itself is refused with 400. Nothing is stored: the value is computed on the server each time the row is read ({ value, computed: true }, or error text in `error` when it cannot be computed). Through the App API a formula's value is returned only if every column it reads is exposed on the same endpoint (readOnly is fine) and visible to the caller, otherwise it is null. Writes to formula, lookup and rollup columns are ignored.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" }, - "description": "Type-specific settings. For dropdown/status/priority: options, either as labels [\"A\",\"B\"] or as full objects [{value,label,color}], labels are expanded server-side, and colors are assigned if you do not supply them.", + "description": "Type-specific settings. For dropdown/status/priority: options, either as labels [\"A\",\"B\"] or as full objects [{value,label,color}], labels are expanded server-side, and colors are assigned if you do not supply them. For a sealed text column (ID numbers): { sealed: { normalize: \"il_id\" }, validation: { unique: true } }.", "type": "object" }, "type": {
--- pinned/deploy_frontend +++ observed/deploy_frontend { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Deploy a static frontend to TaskLite hosting and get a live URL https://{slug}.tasklite.dev (HTTPS, auto-published on first deploy, versions kept for rollback_deployment). Hand over the frontend in ONE of three ways: `files`, the files inline (path + content), the way to go from ChatGPT or any hosted client: write index.html and its assets, then deploy in the same turn; `zipUrl`, a public https URL of a zip (a Lovable/Bolt export, a GitHub release asset); `dir`, a build output folder on this machine (only when the MCP runs locally next to the files); `fromAppId`, a version already hosted in the same organization, copied on the server (start a new app from an existing site, or bring an old version back as a new one; get_deployment_files reads a version first). A real build that already exists on the person's machine fits none of these from a hosted server: tell them to drop the zip on the app's Versions screen (the adminUrl of the app, then Versions), which deploys the same way and keeps the same version history. In the frontend, call the app API via relative /api/{endpoint}, the hosting proxy injects the app identity, so no key ships to the browser.", + "description": "Deploy a static frontend to TaskLite hosting and get a live URL https://{slug}.tasklite.dev (HTTPS, auto-published on first deploy, versions kept for rollback_deployment). Hand over the frontend in ONE of four ways: `files`, the files inline (path + content), the way to go from ChatGPT or any hosted client: write index.html and its assets, then deploy in the same turn; `zipUrl`, a public https URL of a zip (a Lovable/Bolt export, a GitHub release asset); `dir`, a build output folder on this machine (only when the MCP runs locally next to the files); `fromAppId`, a version already hosted in the same organization, copied on the server (start a new app from an existing site, or bring an old version back as a new one; get_deployment_files reads a version first). A real build that already exists on the person's machine fits none of these from a hosted server: tell them to drop the zip on the app's Versions screen (the adminUrl of the app, then Versions), which deploys the same way and keeps the same version history. In the frontend, call the app API via relative /api/{endpoint}, the hosting proxy injects the app identity, so no key ships to the browser. Link previews: WhatsApp, Facebook and Telegram do not run JS, so every client-side route shows the home page's title and image. A site can ship `_og-routes.json` next to index.html: { \"routes\": [ { \"path\": \"/store/:slug\", \"endpoint\": \"sites\", \"match\": \"slug\", \"title\": \"name\", \"description\": \"about\", \"image\": \"logo\" } ] }. path has literal segments and exactly one :param; endpoint is the slug of an App API endpoint of the same app that anonymous visitors can read; match is the alias of the column holding the param's value; title, description and image are column aliases (each optional; image must hold an http(s) URL). Only crawlers get the tags; people get the site as before.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" },
+ tool added: get_permission_history
+ tool added: google_calendar_busy
+ tool added: google_calendar_connect
+ tool added: google_calendar_create_event
+ tool added: google_calendar_delete_event
+ tool added: google_calendar_disconnect
+ tool added: google_calendar_ensure_calendar
+ tool added: google_calendar_list_events
+ tool added: google_calendar_set_return_path
+ tool added: google_calendar_status
+ tool added: google_calendar_update_event
--- pinned/set_board_policy +++ observed/set_board_policy { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": true, - "description": "Set who may read, write, create and delete rows of a board, and which columns, as a JSON document (a FULL REPLACE of the board's policy; read get_board_policy first to change part of one). It is enforced on the app's endpoints of this board whose rowLevelSecurity.mode is \"policy\" (create_app_endpoint / update_app_endpoint). Organization owners, admins and editors using the app are let through unless internalBypass is false. Fields:\n- schemaVersion: 1 (required).\n- internalBypass: default true.\n- rows.read / rows.write: a list of { roles, scope }. scope is \"all\", { \"mine\": \"<column id>\" } (rows whose column points at the caller: a relation to the row that stands for them, their verified phone or email, or a people column; add \"via\": \"<relation column id>\" for one more hop), { \"created\": true } (rows they created through the app) or { \"where\": CONDITION } (rows a condition selects, e.g. open cases older than 3 days, for an escalation view). A user gets the union of the rules that name any of their roles; no rule for their roles means no access.\n- rows.create / rows.delete: plain role lists.\n- columns: { \"<column id or reserved field>\": { \"read\": ACCESS, \"write\": ACCESS } }. ACCESS is a role list, or { \"roles\": [...], \"orMine\": \"<column id>\" } (these roles, or anyone for whom the row is theirs by that column). A column without an entry follows the row rules. An EMPTY list (\"write\": []) locks the column for everyone through the app: use it for assignedTo and for any field only an admin or an action may change. Reserved fields are title, description, status, priority, dueDate and assignedTo, addressed by those names. Reserved fields are open to anyone who may write the row unless you lock them, so lock assignedTo.\n- CONDITION (in where, rules.when): { \"all\": [c...] } | { \"any\": [c...] } | { \"not\": c } | a leaf { \"col\": \"<column id or reserved field>\", \"op\": OP, ... }. OP: eq / neq (with \"value\"), in (value is a list), empty, notEmpty, isMe (the column points at the caller; optional \"via\"), olderThan (col is updatedAt, createdAt or a date column; give \"hours\" or \"days\"), changed (this write sets col; only in rules). No free expressions.\n- rules: [{ \"id\", \"when\": CONDITION, \"deny\": { \"write\": \"*\" | [column ids], \"except\": [roles] }, \"require\": [column ids that must be filled after the write], \"except\": [roles], \"message\" }]. deny is judged on the row as it is BEFORE the write, require AFTER it. Rules bind people acting through the app; internal bypass users and an action's own columns are not held to deny.\n- actions: { \"<name>\": { \"roles\": [...], \"input\": { \"<input name>\": { \"col\": \"<column id the value is written to>\", \"required\": true } }, \"set\": { \"<column id>\": constant }, \"event\": \"TRANSFER\", \"scope\": \"write\" | \"read\", \"approval\": \"<approval workflow id of the board>\" } }. An action is role-gated, validates its input (an input without col is only data; \"reason\" is always accepted and goes to the history), writes its set and bound inputs in one transaction, and records event and reason in the history. It is the only way to change a column whose write is []. With approval it files a request for that workflow instead of writing; the write happens when the last step approves. Roles named by approval steps must exist (define_app_role). Actions run through the App API only (see below).\nFrontends run an action with POST /apps/<slug>/api/<endpoint>/<itemId>/actions/<name> and the inputs as the body; approvers read GET /apps/<slug>/api/me/approvals and answer POST /apps/<slug>/api/approvals/<requestId>/decide { \"decision\": \"approve\" | \"reject\", \"comment\"? }; GET /apps/<slug>/api/me/permissions lists the actions the caller may run as [{ name, allowed, roles, inputs, approval, event, scope }]. There is no MCP tool that runs an action.\nRoles are keys from list_app_roles, plus \"*\" (any signed-in user) and \"public\". Column ids come from get_board_schema. An invalid document is refused with POLICY_INVALID and an errors list naming each problem. Example (agents see and edit only their own cases, the manager sees and edits all, bookkeeping reads all, commission is visible to the owner, the manager and to the agent on his own rows):\n{ \"schemaVersion\": 1,\n \"rows\": {\n \"read\": [ { \"roles\": [\"owner\",\"manager\",\"bookkeeping\"], \"scope\": \"all\" },\n { \"roles\": [\"agent\"], \"scope\": { \"mine\": \"<agent column id>\" } } ],\n \"write\": [ { \"roles\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"], \"scope\": \"all\" },\n { \"roles\": [\"agent\"], \"scope\": { \"mine\": \"<agent column id>\" } } ],\n \"create\": [\"owner\",\"manager\",\"agent\"],\n \"delete\": [\"owner\"] },\n \"columns\": {\n \"<commission column id>\": { \"read\": { \"roles\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"], \"orMine\": \"<agent column id>\" }, \"write\": [\"owner\"] },\n \"<agent column id>\": { \"write\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"] },\n \"assignedTo\": { \"write\": [] } },\n \"rules\": [ { \"id\": \"lock\", \"when\": { \"all\": [ { \"col\": \"<locked column id>\", \"op\": \"eq\", \"value\": true } ] },\n \"deny\": { \"write\": \"*\", \"except\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"] }, \"message\": \"The case is locked to its agent\" } ],\n \"actions\": {\n \"transfer\": { \"roles\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"], \"input\": { \"agent\": { \"col\": \"<agent column id>\", \"required\": true }, \"reason\": { \"required\": true } },\n \"set\": { \"<locked column id>\": false }, \"event\": \"TRANSFER\" },\n \"unlock\": { \"roles\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"], \"input\": { \"reason\": { \"required\": true } }, \"set\": { \"<locked column id>\": false }, \"event\": \"UNLOCK\" },\n \"exception\": { \"roles\": [\"agent\"], \"input\": { \"reason\": { \"required\": true } }, \"set\": { \"<exception column id>\": true }, \"approval\": \"<workflow id, a role step>\" } } }\n(The Achituv shape: a locked case cannot be edited except by the owner and the manager; transfer and unlock are the only way to change the agent or the lock, with a recorded reason; an exception asks a role step for approval.) Test it with explain_access and simulate_request before telling the user it is done. Requires organization owner or admin.", + "description": "Set who may read, write, create and delete rows of a board, and which columns, as a JSON document (a FULL REPLACE of the board's policy; read get_board_policy first to change part of one). It is enforced on the app's endpoints of this board whose rowLevelSecurity.mode is \"policy\" (create_app_endpoint / update_app_endpoint). Organization owners, admins and editors using the app are let through unless internalBypass is false. Fields:\n- schemaVersion: 1 (required).\n- internalBypass: default true.\n- rows.read / rows.write: a list of { roles, scope }. scope is \"all\", { \"mine\": \"<column id>\" } (rows whose column points at the caller: a relation to the row that stands for them, their verified phone or email, or a people column; add \"via\": \"<relation column id>\" for one more hop, or \"via\": [\"<id>\", \"<id>\"] for two, e.g. tenant -> apartment -> framework -> staff is { \"mine\": \"<tenant.apartment>\", \"via\": [\"<apartment.framework>\", \"<framework.managers>\"] }; each hop is a relation column of the board the step before points to, and the last one ends at the people board), { \"created\": true } (rows they created through the app) or { \"where\": CONDITION } (rows a condition selects, e.g. open cases older than 3 days, for an escalation view). A user gets the union of the rules that name any of their roles; no rule for their roles means no access.\n- rows.create / rows.delete: plain role lists.\n- columns: { \"<column id or reserved field>\": { \"read\": ACCESS, \"write\": ACCESS } }. ACCESS is a role list, or { \"roles\": [...], \"orMine\": \"<column id>\" } (these roles, or anyone for whom the row is theirs by that column). A column without an entry follows the row rules. An EMPTY list (\"write\": []) locks the column for everyone through the app: use it for assignedTo and for any field only an admin or an action may change. Reserved fields are title, description, status, priority, dueDate and assignedTo, addressed by those names. Reserved fields are open to anyone who may write the row unless you lock them, so lock assignedTo.\n- CONDITION (in where, rules.when): { \"all\": [c...] } | { \"any\": [c...] } | { \"not\": c } | a leaf { \"col\": \"<column id or reserved field>\", \"op\": OP, ... }. OP: eq / neq (with \"value\"), in (value is a list), empty, notEmpty, isMe (the column points at the caller; optional \"via\", one column id or a list of two), olderThan (col is updatedAt, createdAt or a date column; give \"hours\" or \"days\"), changed (this write sets col; only in rules). No free expressions.\n- rules: [{ \"id\", \"when\": CONDITION, \"deny\": { \"write\": \"*\" | [column ids], \"except\": [roles] }, \"require\": [column ids that must be filled after the write], \"except\": [roles], \"message\" }]. deny is judged on the row as it is BEFORE the write, require AFTER it. Rules bind people acting through the app; internal bypass users and an action's own columns are not held to deny.\n- actions: { \"<name>\": { \"roles\": [...], \"input\": { \"<input name>\": { \"col\": \"<column id the value is written to>\", \"required\": true } }, \"set\": { \"<column id>\": constant }, \"event\": \"TRANSFER\", \"scope\": \"write\" | \"read\", \"approval\": \"<approval workflow id of the board>\" } }. An action is role-gated, validates its input (an input without col is only data; \"reason\" is always accepted and goes to the history), writes its set and bound inputs in one transaction, and records event and reason in the history. It is the only way to change a column whose write is []. With approval it files a request for that workflow instead of writing; the write happens when the last step approves. Roles named by approval steps must exist (define_app_role). Actions run through the App API only (see below).\nFrontends run an action with POST /apps/<slug>/api/<endpoint>/<itemId>/actions/<name> and the inputs as the body; approvers read GET /apps/<slug>/api/me/approvals and answer POST /apps/<slug>/api/approvals/<requestId>/decide { \"decision\": \"approve\" | \"reject\", \"comment\"? }; GET /apps/<slug>/api/me/permissions lists the actions the caller may run as [{ name, allowed, roles, inputs, approval, event, scope }]. There is no MCP tool that runs an action.\nRoles are keys from list_app_roles, plus \"*\" (any signed-in user) and \"public\". Column ids come from get_board_schema. An invalid document is refused with POLICY_INVALID and an errors list naming each problem. Example (agents see and edit only their own cases, the manager sees and edits all, bookkeeping reads all, commission is visible to the owner, the manager and to the agent on his own rows):\n{ \"schemaVersion\": 1,\n \"rows\": {\n \"read\": [ { \"roles\": [\"owner\",\"manager\",\"bookkeeping\"], \"scope\": \"all\" },\n { \"roles\": [\"agent\"], \"scope\": { \"mine\": \"<agent column id>\" } } ],\n \"write\": [ { \"roles\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"], \"scope\": \"all\" },\n { \"roles\": [\"agent\"], \"scope\": { \"mine\": \"<agent column id>\" } } ],\n \"create\": [\"owner\",\"manager\",\"agent\"],\n \"delete\": [\"owner\"] },\n \"columns\": {\n \"<commission column id>\": { \"read\": { \"roles\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"], \"orMine\": \"<agent column id>\" }, \"write\": [\"owner\"] },\n \"<agent column id>\": { \"write\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"] },\n \"assignedTo\": { \"write\": [] } },\n \"rules\": [ { \"id\": \"lock\", \"when\": { \"all\": [ { \"col\": \"<locked column id>\", \"op\": \"eq\", \"value\": true } ] },\n \"deny\": { \"write\": \"*\", \"except\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"] }, \"message\": \"The case is locked to its agent\" } ],\n \"actions\": {\n \"transfer\": { \"roles\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"], \"input\": { \"agent\": { \"col\": \"<agent column id>\", \"required\": true }, \"reason\": { \"required\": true } },\n \"set\": { \"<locked column id>\": false }, \"event\": \"TRANSFER\" },\n \"unlock\": { \"roles\": [\"owner\",\"manager\"], \"input\": { \"reason\": { \"required\": true } }, \"set\": { \"<locked column id>\": false }, \"event\": \"UNLOCK\" },\n \"exception\": { \"roles\": [\"agent\"], \"input\": { \"reason\": { \"required\": true } }, \"set\": { \"<exception column id>\": true }, \"approval\": \"<workflow id, a role step>\" } } }\n(The Achituv shape: a locked case cannot be edited except by the owner and the manager; transfer and unlock are the only way to change the agent or the lock, with a recorded reason; an exception asks a role step for approval.) Test it with explain_access and simulate_request before telling the user it is done. Requires organization owner or admin.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" },
--- pinned/update_app_endpoint +++ observed/update_app_endpoint { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Change an existing endpoint, most often to set exposedColumns on one that was created without them. Get the endpoint id from list_app_endpoints and the column ids from get_board_schema.", + "description": "Change an existing endpoint, most often to set exposedColumns on one that was created without them. Get the endpoint id from list_app_endpoints and the column ids from get_board_schema. In rowLevelSecurity mode phone, phoneColumns adds more phone columns next to phoneColumn (up to 5 in all; a caller whose verified phone is in any of them reaches the row); send it again with every other field, since the object replaces the stored one. The answer may carry `warnings`, e.g. an exposed formula column whose input columns are not exposed (add them, readOnly is fine, or its value comes back null).", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" }, + "phoneColumns": { + "description": "mode \"phone\" only, optional, next to phoneColumn: more phone columns of the same board, up to 5 in all together with phoneColumn. A row is reachable by a caller whose verified phone is in ANY of them; use it for a second manager phone per row. A POST or PATCH body may not write any phone column (400); only the owner of the app sets them in TaskLite. Column ids (get_board_schema)", + "items": { + "type": "string" + }, + "maxItems": 5, + "type": "array" + }, "relationColumn": { "description": "mode \"relation\" only, required there: a RELATION column on this endpoint's board. A row belongs to the caller when this column points at an item that stands for the caller (or, with viaColumn, at an item that points at one). Example: on the Trainees board, the \"Coach\" column. A column id (get_board_schema)", "type": "string"
--- pinned/update_column +++ observed/update_column { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Replaces the column settings, e.g. { options: [...] } for dropdown/status", + "description": "Replaces the column settings, e.g. { options: [...] } for dropdown/status. A sealed column stays sealed unless the new settings say sealed: false; normalize cannot change once it holds values. A formula column takes settings.formula (syntax and rules in create_column), e.g. { formula: \"{Unit price} * {Qty}\" }; renaming or deleting a column a formula reads is allowed and the answer lists the affected formulas in formulaWarnings.", "type": "object" }, "type": {
Changed 2026-11-08 13:30 UTC
3 descriptions rewritten, 8 tools added.
--- pinned/configure_app_settings +++ observed/configure_app_settings { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Read or change the settings object of an app. Call with only appId to read. To change, pass set: the keys in it are MERGED into the current settings (objects merge key by key at every depth, arrays and plain values replace, null removes a key). The server itself does not merge: PATCH replaces the whole settings object with what it is sent, so this tool reads the app, merges, and writes the full object back; two writers at the same moment can still overwrite each other, so do not run it in parallel on one app. Settings the server reads: ai (AI actions the app may run: { enabled: true, userDaily?, appDaily?, actions: { \"<name>\": { instructions, output?: \"text\"|\"json\", schema? (a JSON Schema, required for json), inputs?: { \"<input>\": { maxChars?, required? } }, tier?: \"fast\"|\"smart\", maxOutputTokens?, temperature?, audience?: \"users\"|\"server\" } } }. The instructions stay on the server: a page runs an action by name with POST /apps/<slug>/api/_ai/v1/run { action, input } and the signed-in user's own token (the app's server may use a key with the \"ai\" scope). Every run is charged to the owner's usage allowance; 429 AI_QUOTA_EXCEEDED, AI_USER_DAILY_LIMIT or AI_RATE_LIMIT carry messageHe/message to show. An app without sign-in cannot run AI actions), passwordReset.returnUrls (array of up to 50 URLs the \"reset password\" email may send a user back to, matched by scheme, host, port and path prefix; needed only for a custom app scheme such as myapp://reset or a domain other than the app's own {slug}.tasklite.dev and its connected custom domains, which are always allowed; http is never accepted), language (the language of the password reset email: a value starting with \"he\" gives Hebrew, any other value English; left out, the user's own language decides), endUserDeletion.rows (\"delete\": when an end user deletes their account, the rows they wrote in this app are deleted with it and erased for good 30 days later; left out, the rows stay with the author shown as a deleted account). Other keys are stored as given and returned, and the server does not act on them.", + "description": "Read or change the settings object of an app. Call with only appId to read. To change, pass set: the keys in it are MERGED into the current settings (objects merge key by key at every depth, arrays and plain values replace, null removes a key). The server itself does not merge: PATCH replaces the whole settings object with what it is sent, so this tool reads the app, merges, and writes the full object back; two writers at the same moment can still overwrite each other, so do not run it in parallel on one app. Settings the server reads: ai (AI actions the app may run: { enabled: true, userDaily?, appDaily?, actions: { \"<name>\": { instructions, output?: \"text\"|\"json\", schema? (a JSON Schema, required for json), inputs?: { \"<input>\": { maxChars?, required? } }, tier?: \"fast\"|\"smart\", maxOutputTokens?, temperature?, audience?: \"users\"|\"server\", files?: { max? (1 to 5), required?, allowInstruction?, allowSchema? } } } }. The instructions stay on the server: a page runs an action by name with POST /apps/<slug>/api/_ai/v1/run { action, input } and the signed-in user's own token (the app's server may use a key with the \"ai\" scope). Every run is charged to the owner's usage allowance; 429 AI_QUOTA_EXCEEDED, AI_USER_DAILY_LIMIT or AI_RATE_LIMIT carry messageHe/message to show. An app without sign-in cannot run AI actions. With files set on an action (and the backend switch APP_AI_FILES on) the call may add files: [{ endpoint, itemId, field, attachmentId }] of a file column the caller can read through the app API, up to 10MB and 30 PDF pages each, and the model reads the PDF or image itself; allowInstruction lets the caller add an instruction string, allowSchema lets it send a JSON Schema for the answer; errors come back in Hebrew), passwordReset.returnUrls (array of up to 50 URLs the \"reset password\" email may send a user back to, matched by scheme, host, port and path prefix; needed only for a custom app scheme such as myapp://reset or a domain other than the app's own {slug}.tasklite.dev and its connected custom domains, which are always allowed; http is never accepted), language (the language of the password reset email: a value starting with \"he\" gives Hebrew, any other value English; left out, the user's own language decides), endUserDeletion.rows (\"delete\": when an end user deletes their account, the rows they wrote in this app are deleted with it and erased for good 30 days later; left out, the rows stay with the author shown as a deleted account). Other keys are stored as given and returned, and the server does not act on them.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" },
+ tool added: configure_telephony_mapping
--- pinned/create_automation +++ observed/create_automation { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Create an automation on a board: when something happens, do something. The most useful action here is http_request, which calls an external API and writes the answer back into columns, pair it with the \"scheduled\" trigger and the board keeps itself up to date (prices, exchange rates, shipment status, weather). Triggers: item_created, status_changed, column_value_changed, date_approaching, scheduled. Actions: http_request, send_notification, send_email, send_push, change_status, set_column_value, create_cross_board_item, send_webhook. The scheduled trigger has no cron expression: the server checks once an hour, and triggerConfig takes { intervalHours, runAtHour } only (intervalHours: at least this many hours between runs, default 24; runAtHour: 0-23, run only during that hour of the day in UTC, not in the user's time zone, so convert: 08:00 in Israel is runAtHour 5 in summer and 6 in winter). A scheduled run executes the actions once for every row of the board that passes conditions, so filter with conditions. send_push sends a notification to the phones of app users through the app's own Firebase project (set up once per app: push_status; try it with send_test_push). Its config: { title, body, data, userIds, recipientsFromRelation, includeRowOwner, sound, badge, dataOnly }. title and body take {{column name}} placeholders, title defaults to the row title. Recipients are the union of: the row's owner under row-level security (includeRowOwner, default true; false leaves them out), userIds (fixed user ids, as in list_app_users), and recipientsFromRelation, a dotted path of column NAMES such as \"Client.Coach.Coach user\" that walks relation columns from this row and whose LAST segment must be a people column holding user ids (a single segment is a people column on this board); it does not resolve the user linked to a row by an invite or by phone, so without such a people column use userIds or the row owner. data is a flat object of strings the app reads to decide where to open (itemId and boardId are added). sound: \"default\" or the file name of a sound bundled in the app; badge: 0 to 99999, 0 clears; dataOnly: true shows nothing and delivers only data (no title, body, sound or badge; iOS may throttle or drop it). With no recipient the action is skipped, not failed. Two more things every action list can use: a { type: \"delay\", config: { minutes | hours | days } } action pauses the run and resumes the actions after it later (reminders, follow-ups); and any network action (http_request, send_webhook, send_email, send_whatsapp) may carry config.retry: { attempts (1-5), delaySeconds (1-60) }. send_webhook accepts config.secret for an HMAC signature. send_email sends mail from the organization to the people on a row. Its config: { to, subject, body, columnEmailField, fromName, replyTo, kind, attachments }. kind is \"transactional\" (the default: orders, receipts, notifications) or \"marketing\" (promotional mail: it needs the Pro plan or higher and a verified sender domain, and it gets an unsubscribe footer; people who unsubscribed are skipped). attachments is an array of FILE column ids on the triggering row (or {{column.<id>}}): the stored files in those cells are attached, up to 5MB in total, and a missing file is skipped instead of failing the action. Email is counted per month by plan: Free 300, Plus 3000, Pro 20000 (read the numbers with get_email_usage); a message held back by the quota is recorded as skipped in the communications log and can be resent from there. To send email from an app's own server instead of an automation, POST /apps/<slug>/api/_email/send with the app server key (X-API-Key, never a user token; the key needs the \"email\" or \"write\" scope, see create_app_api_key): { to: [up to 50 addresses], subject, html or text, replyTo, kind, attachmentIds: [stored file ids] }; each app may send 500 a day (429 APP_EMAIL_DAILY_LIMIT). create_cross_board_item copies a new row to another board: config { targetBoardId, title?: \"{{item.title}}\", columnValues: { \"<column id on the TARGET board>\": \"{{<column NAME on this board>}}\" } }; there is no mapping field, and a column left out is not copied. To act only on some rows pass conditions, e.g. [{ field: \"<column id on this board>\", operator: \"equals\", value: \"New seller\" }]. Change an automation later with update_automation; call list_automations first so you do not add a second one that does the same thing.", + "description": "Create an automation on a board: when something happens, do something. The most useful action here is http_request, which calls an external API and writes the answer back into columns, pair it with the \"scheduled\" trigger and the board keeps itself up to date (prices, exchange rates, shipment status, weather). Triggers: item_created, item_deleted, status_changed, column_value_changed, date_approaching, scheduled. Actions: http_request, send_notification, send_email, send_push, change_status, set_column_value, create_cross_board_item, send_webhook, recompute_related_rollup. The scheduled trigger has no cron expression: the server checks once an hour, and triggerConfig takes { intervalHours, runAtHour } only (intervalHours: at least this many hours between runs, default 24; runAtHour: 0-23, run only during that hour of the day in UTC, not in the user's time zone, so convert: 08:00 in Israel is runAtHour 5 in summer and 6 in winter). A scheduled run executes the actions once for every row of the board that passes conditions, so filter with conditions. send_push sends a notification to the phones of app users through the app's own Firebase project (set up once per app: push_status; try it with send_test_push). Its config: { title, body, data, userIds, recipientsFromRelation, includeRowOwner, sound, badge, dataOnly }. title and body take {{column name}} placeholders, title defaults to the row title. Recipients are the union of: the row's owner under row-level security (includeRowOwner, default true; false leaves them out), userIds (fixed user ids, as in list_app_users), and recipientsFromRelation, a dotted path of column NAMES such as \"Client.Coach.Coach user\" that walks relation columns from this row and whose LAST segment must be a people column holding user ids (a single segment is a people column on this board); it does not resolve the user linked to a row by an invite or by phone, so without such a people column use userIds or the row owner. data is a flat object of strings the app reads to decide where to open (itemId and boardId are added). sound: \"default\" or the file name of a sound bundled in the app; badge: 0 to 99999, 0 clears; dataOnly: true shows nothing and delivers only data (no title, body, sound or badge; iOS may throttle or drop it). With no recipient the action is skipped, not failed. recompute_related_rollup keeps one column of a parent row equal to an aggregate of its child rows (a case's next action date from its open activities, an order total from its lines): put the automation on the CHILD board (triggers item_created, item_deleted and column_value_changed with no column named, which fires on any column change), config { relationColumnId (a relation column of the child board; targetRelation = its name works too), targetColumnId (a column of the parent board, which must be in the same project), aggregate: \"min\" | \"max\" | \"count\" | \"sum\", sourceColumnId (child column; not needed for count), where?: [{ field: \"<child column id>\", operator, value }] (AND, same operators as conditions, e.g. done not_equals \"true\"), whenEmpty?: number | null }. min and max take number, date or datetime columns and the target must be the same type; sum and count write to a number column. With no matching child the target is cleared (min, max) or set to 0 (count, sum) unless whenEmpty says otherwise. It writes through the normal path, so history and the parent board's own automations see the change, but it does not start another rollup. At most 5000 children per parent; more fails the run and writes nothing. Rows imported with board-import (new rows) and edits through the App API fire it; updating existing rows through board-import does not. Two more things every action list can use: a { type: \"delay\", config: { minutes | hours | days } } action pauses the run and resumes the actions after it later (reminders, follow-ups); and any network action (http_request, send_webhook, send_email, send_whatsapp) may carry config.retry: { attempts (1-5), delaySeconds (1-60) }. send_webhook accepts config.secret for an HMAC signature. send_email sends mail from the organization to the people on a row. Its config: { to, subject, body, columnEmailField, fromName, replyTo, kind, attachments }. kind is \"transactional\" (the default: orders, receipts, notifications) or \"marketing\" (promotional mail: it needs the Pro plan or higher and a verified sender domain, and it gets an unsubscribe footer; people who unsubscribed are skipped). attachments is an array of FILE column ids on the triggering row (or {{column.<id>}}): the stored files in those cells are attached, up to 5MB in total, and a missing file is skipped instead of failing the action. Email is counted per month by plan: Free 300, Plus 3000, Pro 20000 (read the numbers with get_email_usage); a message held back by the quota is recorded as skipped in the communications log and can be resent from there. To send email from an app's own server instead of an automation, POST /apps/<slug>/api/_email/send with the app server key (X-API-Key, never a user token; the key needs the \"email\" or \"write\" scope, see create_app_api_key): { to: [up to 50 addresses], subject, html or text, replyTo, kind, attachmentIds: [stored file ids] }; each app may send 500 a day (429 APP_EMAIL_DAILY_LIMIT). create_cross_board_item copies a new row to another board: config { targetBoardId, title?: \"{{item.title}}\", columnValues: { \"<column id on the TARGET board>\": \"{{<column NAME on this board>}}\" } }; there is no mapping field, and a column left out is not copied. To act only on some rows pass conditions, e.g. [{ field: \"<column id on this board>\", operator: \"equals\", value: \"New seller\" }]. Change an automation later with update_automation; call list_automations first so you do not add a second one that does the same thing.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" },
--- pinned/create_signature_request +++ observed/create_signature_request { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Send a PDF for electronic signature and get the signing links back. One call: the PDF (an attachment already on an item, see list_uploaded_files / request_file_upload, or the bytes as base64), the signers, and optionally the row it belongs to. Each signer opens a personal link with an expiry, confirms a one-time code, reads the document and signs; the platform then seals the PDF with an evidence page and emails every signer the signed copy. With no fields, a signature page (name, signature, date per signer) is added at the end, so \"read, then sign at the end\" needs no coordinates. With itemId and signedFileColumnId (a file column on that item's board), the signed PDF is added to that cell when everyone has signed: build what happens next as an automation on \"column value changed\" of that column (set a status, notify, webhook). Delivery: by default the invitation and the code go to each signer's email. Per signer, channel=\"sms\" or \"whatsapp\" (with a phone) sends them there instead; the invitation by WhatsApp only reaches a person who wrote to our number in the last day, and SMS reaches Israeli mobile numbers only. When the channel cannot be used the platform falls back to email and records that in the audit trail. If a signer declines, the document is stopped, the sender is emailed with the reason, and with declinedColumnId (a status, dropdown, label or text column on the item's board) the item gets declinedValue there (default text: declined), like the signed file does. sendEmail=false skips the invitation messages and the links are yours to hand over (open on the agent's phone). For a customer app the same thing is in its own API: /api/_esign (script /api/_esign/sign, TaskLiteSign).", + "description": "Send a PDF for electronic signature and get the signing links back. One call: the PDF (an attachment already on an item, see list_uploaded_files / request_file_upload, or the bytes as base64), the signers, and optionally the row it belongs to. Each signer opens a personal link with an expiry, confirms a one-time code, reads the document and signs; the platform then seals the PDF with an evidence page and emails every signer the signed copy. With no fields, a signature page (name, signature, date per signer) is added at the end, so \"read, then sign at the end\" needs no coordinates. With itemId and signedFileColumnId (a file column on that item's board), the signed PDF is added to that cell when everyone has signed: build what happens next as an automation on \"column value changed\" of that column (set a status, notify, webhook). Delivery: by default the invitation and the code go to each signer's email. Per signer, channel=\"sms\" or \"whatsapp\" (with a phone) sends them there instead; the invitation by WhatsApp only reaches a person who wrote to our number in the last day, and SMS reaches Israeli mobile numbers only. When the channel cannot be used, or the daily limit for SMS and WhatsApp is spent (per organization and per number, set by the platform), the platform falls back to email and records that in the audit trail. The one-time code never goes to the same channel as the link: with the link on SMS the code is tried on WhatsApp, with the link on WhatsApp on SMS, otherwise email. declinedValue must be an existing label for a status, dropdown or label column. If a signer declines, the document is stopped, the sender is emailed with the reason, and with declinedColumnId (a status, dropdown, label or text column on the item's board) the item gets declinedValue there (default text: declined), like the signed file does. sendEmail=false skips the invitation messages and the links are yours to hand over (open on the agent's phone). For a customer app the same thing is in its own API: /api/_esign (script /api/_esign/sign, TaskLiteSign).", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" }, - "description": "How the invitation and the one-time code reach this signer. Default email. Falls back to email when sms or whatsapp cannot be used (no phone, not an Israeli mobile for sms, outside the WhatsApp 24 hour window, not configured)", + "description": "How the invitation and the one-time code reach this signer. Default email. Falls back to email when sms or whatsapp cannot be used (no phone, not an Israeli mobile for sms, outside the WhatsApp 24 hour window, not configured, daily limit reached)", "enum": [ "email", "sms",
+ tool added: disconnect_telephony
+ tool added: get_telephony_connection
+ tool added: list_telephony_providers
+ tool added: preview_telephony_sync
+ tool added: run_telephony_sync
+ tool added: start_telephony_connection
+ tool added: test_telephony_connection
Changed 2026-11-06 14:29 UTC
1 description rewritten, 1 schema or annotation change with the description left byte-identical.
--- pinned/create_signature_request +++ observed/create_signature_request { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Send a PDF for electronic signature and get the signing links back. One call: the PDF (an attachment already on an item, see list_uploaded_files / request_file_upload, or the bytes as base64), the signers, and optionally the row it belongs to. Each signer opens a personal link with an expiry, confirms a one-time code sent to their email or WhatsApp, reads the document and signs; the platform then seals the PDF with an evidence page and emails every signer the signed copy. With no fields, a signature page (name, signature, date per signer) is added at the end, so \"read, then sign at the end\" needs no coordinates. With itemId and signedFileColumnId (a file column on that item's board), the signed PDF is added to that cell when everyone has signed: build what happens next as an automation on \"column value changed\" of that column (set a status, notify, webhook). sendEmail=false skips the invitation emails and the links are yours to hand over (WhatsApp, open on the agent's phone). For a customer app the same thing is in its own API: /api/_esign (script /api/_esign/sign, TaskLiteSign).", + "description": "Send a PDF for electronic signature and get the signing links back. One call: the PDF (an attachment already on an item, see list_uploaded_files / request_file_upload, or the bytes as base64), the signers, and optionally the row it belongs to. Each signer opens a personal link with an expiry, confirms a one-time code, reads the document and signs; the platform then seals the PDF with an evidence page and emails every signer the signed copy. With no fields, a signature page (name, signature, date per signer) is added at the end, so \"read, then sign at the end\" needs no coordinates. With itemId and signedFileColumnId (a file column on that item's board), the signed PDF is added to that cell when everyone has signed: build what happens next as an automation on \"column value changed\" of that column (set a status, notify, webhook). Delivery: by default the invitation and the code go to each signer's email. Per signer, channel=\"sms\" or \"whatsapp\" (with a phone) sends them there instead; the invitation by WhatsApp only reaches a person who wrote to our number in the last day, and SMS reaches Israeli mobile numbers only. When the channel cannot be used the platform falls back to email and records that in the audit trail. If a signer declines, the document is stopped, the sender is emailed with the reason, and with declinedColumnId (a status, dropdown, label or text column on the item's board) the item gets declinedValue there (default text: declined), like the signed file does. sendEmail=false skips the invitation messages and the links are yours to hand over (open on the agent's phone). For a customer app the same thing is in its own API: /api/_esign (script /api/_esign/sign, TaskLiteSign).", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" }, + "declinedColumnId": { + "description": "Status, dropdown, label or text column on the item's board that records a decline", + "type": "string" + }, + "declinedValue": { + "description": "What to write in declinedColumnId when a signer declines (must be a valid label for a status column). Default: a text saying the signer declined", + "maxLength": 200, + "type": "string" + }, "expiryDays": { "description": "How long the links work. Default 14", "maximum": 90, + "channel": { + "description": "How the invitation and the one-time code reach this signer. Default email. Falls back to email when sms or whatsapp cannot be used (no phone, not an Israeli mobile for sms, outside the WhatsApp 24 hour window, not configured)", + "enum": [ + "email", + "sms", + "whatsapp" + ], + "type": "string" + }, "email": { - "description": "Required: the code (unless WhatsApp) and the signed copy go here", + "description": "Required: the invitation and code go here by default, and the signed copy always", "format": "email", "type": "string" }, - "description": "E.164, for a WhatsApp code", + "description": "Needed for channel sms or whatsapp", "type": "string" } },
--- pinned/deploy_frontend +++ observed/deploy_frontend { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Local path to the BUILD OUTPUT directory (the one containing index.html), not the project root. Only where the MCP runs on the same machine as the files", + "description": "Local path to the BUILD OUTPUT directory (the one containing index.html), not the project root. Only where the MCP runs on the same machine as the files. A folder too big for one upload (over 95MB zipped, a copied WordPress store) is sent in parts and goes live as one version", "type": "string" }, "files": { - "description": "Public https URL of a zip of the BUILD OUTPUT (index.html at the root, or inside a single top-level folder). Up to 50MB", + "description": "Public https URL of a zip of the BUILD OUTPUT (index.html at the root, or inside a single top-level folder). Up to 95MB", "format": "uri", "type": "string" }
Changed 2026-11-03 14:26 UTC
1 description rewritten, 1 schema or annotation change with the description left byte-identical, 5 tools added.
--- pinned/configure_app_settings +++ observed/configure_app_settings { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Read or change the settings object of an app. Call with only appId to read. To change, pass set: the keys in it are MERGED into the current settings (objects merge key by key at every depth, arrays and plain values replace, null removes a key). The server itself does not merge: PATCH replaces the whole settings object with what it is sent, so this tool reads the app, merges, and writes the full object back; two writers at the same moment can still overwrite each other, so do not run it in parallel on one app. Settings the server reads: passwordReset.returnUrls (array of up to 50 URLs the \"reset password\" email may send a user back to, matched by scheme, host, port and path prefix; needed only for a custom app scheme such as myapp://reset or a domain other than the app's own {slug}.tasklite.dev and its connected custom domains, which are always allowed; http is never accepted), language (the language of the password reset email: a value starting with \"he\" gives Hebrew, any other value English; left out, the user's own language decides), endUserDeletion.rows (\"delete\": when an end user deletes their account, the rows they wrote in this app are deleted with it and erased for good 30 days later; left out, the rows stay with the author shown as a deleted account). Other keys are stored as given and returned, and the server does not act on them.", + "description": "Read or change the settings object of an app. Call with only appId to read. To change, pass set: the keys in it are MERGED into the current settings (objects merge key by key at every depth, arrays and plain values replace, null removes a key). The server itself does not merge: PATCH replaces the whole settings object with what it is sent, so this tool reads the app, merges, and writes the full object back; two writers at the same moment can still overwrite each other, so do not run it in parallel on one app. Settings the server reads: ai (AI actions the app may run: { enabled: true, userDaily?, appDaily?, actions: { \"<name>\": { instructions, output?: \"text\"|\"json\", schema? (a JSON Schema, required for json), inputs?: { \"<input>\": { maxChars?, required? } }, tier?: \"fast\"|\"smart\", maxOutputTokens?, temperature?, audience?: \"users\"|\"server\" } } }. The instructions stay on the server: a page runs an action by name with POST /apps/<slug>/api/_ai/v1/run { action, input } and the signed-in user's own token (the app's server may use a key with the \"ai\" scope). Every run is charged to the owner's usage allowance; 429 AI_QUOTA_EXCEEDED, AI_USER_DAILY_LIMIT or AI_RATE_LIMIT carry messageHe/message to show. An app without sign-in cannot run AI actions), passwordReset.returnUrls (array of up to 50 URLs the \"reset password\" email may send a user back to, matched by scheme, host, port and path prefix; needed only for a custom app scheme such as myapp://reset or a domain other than the app's own {slug}.tasklite.dev and its connected custom domains, which are always allowed; http is never accepted), language (the language of the password reset email: a value starting with \"he\" gives Hebrew, any other value English; left out, the user's own language decides), endUserDeletion.rows (\"delete\": when an end user deletes their account, the rows they wrote in this app are deleted with it and erased for good 30 days later; left out, the rows stay with the author shown as a deleted account). Other keys are stored as given and returned, and the server does not act on them.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" },
--- pinned/create_app_api_key +++ observed/create_app_api_key { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Permissions on the key: \"read\", \"write\", \"email\". Omit to match the app: write when any endpoint accepts POST, PATCH or DELETE. Sending email from the app server (POST /apps/<slug>/api/_email/send) needs the key to include \"email\" or \"write\"; a read-only key is refused with 403 APP_KEY_SCOPE_REQUIRED.", + "description": "Permissions on the key: \"read\", \"write\", \"email\", \"ai\". Omit to match the app: write when any endpoint accepts POST, PATCH or DELETE. Sending email from the app server (POST /apps/<slug>/api/_email/send) needs the key to include \"email\" or \"write\"; a read-only key is refused with 403 APP_KEY_SCOPE_REQUIRED. Running the app's AI actions from its server (POST /apps/<slug>/api/_ai/v1/run, see configure_app_settings ai) needs \"ai\"; \"write\" does not include it.", "items": { "enum": [ "read", - "email" + "email", + "ai" ], "type": "string" },
+ tool added: create_signature_request
+ tool added: get_signature_request
+ tool added: list_signature_requests
+ tool added: signature_link
+ tool added: void_signature_request
Changed 2026-10-21 11:55 UTC
2 descriptions rewritten, 4 schema or annotation changes with the description left byte-identical, 17 tools added.
--- pinned/build_backend +++ observed/build_backend { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (on its access list, or an owner, admin or editor of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. Anyone else who signs in is refused with 403, so put the people who run the app on the list with add_app_user (their phone and a role; it works before their first sign-in). \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", + "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (on its access list, or an owner, admin or editor of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. Anyone else who signs in is refused with 403, so put the people who run the app on the list with add_app_user (their phone and a role; it works before their first sign-in). \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST. \"policy\": the endpoint follows the access policy of its board (set_board_policy): business roles (define_app_role and grant_app_role, or set_policy_identity), row scope per role, per-column read and write rules. It takes no other rowLevelSecurity field; the board needs a policy and the users need roles, so test with explain_access and simulate_request", "enum": [ "owner", "shared", - "relation" + "relation", + "policy" ], "type": "string" },
--- pinned/create_app_api_key +++ observed/create_app_api_key { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Permissions recorded on the key: [\"read\"] or [\"read\",\"write\"]. Omit to match the app: write when any endpoint accepts POST, PATCH or DELETE.", + "description": "Permissions on the key: \"read\", \"write\", \"email\". Omit to match the app: write when any endpoint accepts POST, PATCH or DELETE. Sending email from the app server (POST /apps/<slug>/api/_email/send) needs the key to include \"email\" or \"write\"; a read-only key is refused with 403 APP_KEY_SCOPE_REQUIRED.", "items": { "enum": [ "read", - "write" + "write", + "email" ], "type": "string" },
--- pinned/create_app_endpoint +++ observed/create_app_endpoint { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (on its access list, or an owner, admin or editor of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. Anyone else who signs in is refused with 403, so put the people who run the app on the list with add_app_user (their phone and a role; it works before their first sign-in). \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", + "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (on its access list, or an owner, admin or editor of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. Anyone else who signs in is refused with 403, so put the people who run the app on the list with add_app_user (their phone and a role; it works before their first sign-in). \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST. \"policy\": the endpoint follows the access policy of its board (set_board_policy): business roles (define_app_role and grant_app_role, or set_policy_identity), row scope per role, per-column read and write rules. It takes no other rowLevelSecurity field; the board needs a policy and the users need roles, so test with explain_access and simulate_request", "enum": [ "owner", "shared", - "relation" + "relation", + "policy" ], "type": "string" },
--- pinned/create_automation +++ observed/create_automation { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Create an automation on a board: when something happens, do something. The most useful action here is http_request, which calls an external API and writes the answer back into columns, pair it with the \"scheduled\" trigger and the board keeps itself up to date (prices, exchange rates, shipment status, weather). Triggers: item_created, status_changed, column_value_changed, date_approaching, scheduled. Actions: http_request, send_notification, send_email, send_push, change_status, set_column_value, create_cross_board_item, send_webhook. The scheduled trigger has no cron expression: the server checks once an hour, and triggerConfig takes { intervalHours, runAtHour } only (intervalHours: at least this many hours between runs, default 24; runAtHour: 0-23, run only during that hour of the day in UTC, not in the user's time zone, so convert: 08:00 in Israel is runAtHour 5 in summer and 6 in winter). A scheduled run executes the actions once for every row of the board that passes conditions, so filter with conditions. send_push sends a notification to the phones of app users through the app's own Firebase project (set up once per app: push_status; try it with send_test_push). Its config: { title, body, data, userIds, recipientsFromRelation, includeRowOwner, sound, badge, dataOnly }. title and body take {{column name}} placeholders, title defaults to the row title. Recipients are the union of: the row's owner under row-level security (includeRowOwner, default true; false leaves them out), userIds (fixed user ids, as in list_app_users), and recipientsFromRelation, a dotted path of column NAMES such as \"Client.Coach.Coach user\" that walks relation columns from this row and whose LAST segment must be a people column holding user ids (a single segment is a people column on this board); it does not resolve the user linked to a row by an invite or by phone, so without such a people column use userIds or the row owner. data is a flat object of strings the app reads to decide where to open (itemId and boardId are added). sound: \"default\" or the file name of a sound bundled in the app; badge: 0 to 99999, 0 clears; dataOnly: true shows nothing and delivers only data (no title, body, sound or badge; iOS may throttle or drop it). With no recipient the action is skipped, not failed. Two more things every action list can use: a { type: \"delay\", config: { minutes | hours | days } } action pauses the run and resumes the actions after it later (reminders, follow-ups); and any network action (http_request, send_webhook, send_email, send_whatsapp) may carry config.retry: { attempts (1-5), delaySeconds (1-60) }. send_webhook accepts config.secret for an HMAC signature. create_cross_board_item copies a new row to another board: config { targetBoardId, title?: \"{{item.title}}\", columnValues: { \"<column id on the TARGET board>\": \"{{<column NAME on this board>}}\" } }; there is no mapping field, and a column left out is not copied. To act only on some rows pass conditions, e.g. [{ field: \"<column id on this board>\", operator: \"equals\", value: \"New seller\" }]. Change an automation later with update_automation; call list_automations first so you do not add a second one that does the same thing.", + "description": "Create an automation on a board: when something happens, do something. The most useful action here is http_request, which calls an external API and writes the answer back into columns, pair it with the \"scheduled\" trigger and the board keeps itself up to date (prices, exchange rates, shipment status, weather). Triggers: item_created, status_changed, column_value_changed, date_approaching, scheduled. Actions: http_request, send_notification, send_email, send_push, change_status, set_column_value, create_cross_board_item, send_webhook. The scheduled trigger has no cron expression: the server checks once an hour, and triggerConfig takes { intervalHours, runAtHour } only (intervalHours: at least this many hours between runs, default 24; runAtHour: 0-23, run only during that hour of the day in UTC, not in the user's time zone, so convert: 08:00 in Israel is runAtHour 5 in summer and 6 in winter). A scheduled run executes the actions once for every row of the board that passes conditions, so filter with conditions. send_push sends a notification to the phones of app users through the app's own Firebase project (set up once per app: push_status; try it with send_test_push). Its config: { title, body, data, userIds, recipientsFromRelation, includeRowOwner, sound, badge, dataOnly }. title and body take {{column name}} placeholders, title defaults to the row title. Recipients are the union of: the row's owner under row-level security (includeRowOwner, default true; false leaves them out), userIds (fixed user ids, as in list_app_users), and recipientsFromRelation, a dotted path of column NAMES such as \"Client.Coach.Coach user\" that walks relation columns from this row and whose LAST segment must be a people column holding user ids (a single segment is a people column on this board); it does not resolve the user linked to a row by an invite or by phone, so without such a people column use userIds or the row owner. data is a flat object of strings the app reads to decide where to open (itemId and boardId are added). sound: \"default\" or the file name of a sound bundled in the app; badge: 0 to 99999, 0 clears; dataOnly: true shows nothing and delivers only data (no title, body, sound or badge; iOS may throttle or drop it). With no recipient the action is skipped, not failed. Two more things every action list can use: a { type: \"delay\", config: { minutes | hours | days } } action pauses the run and resumes the actions after it later (reminders, follow-ups); and any network action (http_request, send_webhook, send_email, send_whatsapp) may carry config.retry: { attempts (1-5), delaySeconds (1-60) }. send_webhook accepts config.secret for an HMAC signature. send_email sends mail from the organization to the people on a row. Its config: { to, subject, body, columnEmailField, fromName, replyTo, kind, attachments }. kind is \"transactional\" (the default: orders, receipts, notifications) or \"marketing\" (promotional mail: it needs the Pro plan or higher and a verified sender domain, and it gets an unsubscribe footer; people who unsubscribed are skipped). attachments is an array of FILE column ids on the triggering row (or {{column.<id>}}): the stored files in those cells are attached, up to 5MB in total, and a missing file is skipped instead of failing the action. Email is counted per month by plan: Free 300, Plus 3000, Pro 20000 (read the numbers with get_email_usage); a message held back by the quota is recorded as skipped in the communications log and can be resent from there. To send email from an app's own server instead of an automation, POST /apps/<slug>/api/_email/send with the app server key (X-API-Key, never a user token; the key needs the \"email\" or \"write\" scope, see create_app_api_key): { to: [up to 50 addresses], subject, html or text, replyTo, kind, attachmentIds: [stored file ids] }; each app may send 500 a day (429 APP_EMAIL_DAILY_LIMIT). create_cross_board_item copies a new row to another board: config { targetBoardId, title?: \"{{item.title}}\", columnValues: { \"<column id on the TARGET board>\": \"{{<column NAME on this board>}}\" } }; there is no mapping field, and a column left out is not copied. To act only on some rows pass conditions, e.g. [{ field: \"<column id on this board>\", operator: \"equals\", value: \"New seller\" }]. Change an automation later with update_automation; call list_automations first so you do not add a second one that does the same thing.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" }, - "description": "Action-specific config, e.g. { url, method, headers, responseMapping } for http_request, or { title, body, recipientsFromRelation, includeRowOwner, userIds, data, sound, badge, dataOnly } for send_push", + "description": "Action-specific config, e.g. { url, method, headers, responseMapping } for http_request, { title, body, recipientsFromRelation, includeRowOwner, userIds, data, sound, badge, dataOnly } for send_push, or { to, subject, body, kind: \"transactional\" | \"marketing\", attachments: [\"<file column id>\"] } for send_email", "type": "object" }, "type": {
+ tool added: define_app_role
+ tool added: delete_app_role
+ tool added: delete_board_policy
+ tool added: explain_access
+ tool added: get_board_policy
+ tool added: get_cells
+ tool added: get_email_usage
+ tool added: get_item_history
+ tool added: get_policy_identity
+ tool added: grant_app_role
+ tool added: list_app_role_grants
+ tool added: list_app_roles
+ tool added: revoke_app_role
+ tool added: set_board_policy
+ tool added: set_cells_if_unchanged
+ tool added: set_policy_identity
+ tool added: simulate_request
--- pinned/update_app_endpoint +++ observed/update_app_endpoint { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (on its access list, or an owner, admin or editor of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. Anyone else who signs in is refused with 403, so put the people who run the app on the list with add_app_user (their phone and a role; it works before their first sign-in). \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", + "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (on its access list, or an owner, admin or editor of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. Anyone else who signs in is refused with 403, so put the people who run the app on the list with add_app_user (their phone and a role; it works before their first sign-in). \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST. \"policy\": the endpoint follows the access policy of its board (set_board_policy): business roles (define_app_role and grant_app_role, or set_policy_identity), row scope per role, per-column read and write rules. It takes no other rowLevelSecurity field; the board needs a policy and the users need roles, so test with explain_access and simulate_request", "enum": [ "owner", "shared", - "relation" + "relation", + "policy" ], "type": "string" },
--- pinned/update_automation +++ observed/update_automation { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Change an existing automation: its actions, conditions, trigger config or name, or switch it off with isActive false. Fields left out stay as they are; actions and conditions, when given, replace the whole list. Use it to fix an automation instead of creating a second one next to it. Get the id from list_automations.", + "description": "Change an existing automation: its actions, conditions, trigger config or name, or switch it off with isActive false. Fields left out stay as they are; actions and conditions, when given, replace the whole list. Use it to fix an automation instead of creating a second one next to it. Get the id from list_automations. For send_email actions, config.kind is transactional (default) or marketing (Pro plan or higher, verified sender domain, unsubscribe footer) and config.attachments is an array of file column ids on the row; see create_automation.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" },
Changed 2026-10-15 11:34 UTC
3 descriptions rewritten, 5 schema or annotation changes with the description left byte-identical, 3 tools added.
+ tool added: add_app_user
--- pinned/build_backend +++ observed/build_backend { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (listed on it, or an owner/admin of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", + "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (on its access list, or an owner, admin or editor of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. Anyone else who signs in is refused with 403, so put the people who run the app on the list with add_app_user (their phone and a role; it works before their first sign-in). \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", "enum": [ "owner", "shared",
--- pinned/configure_external_access +++ observed/configure_external_access { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Read or change how EXTERNAL users (people who sign up to your app through TaskLite auth) get into an organization. They have two ways in, and both obey the policy below: email and password (POST /auth/register-external with this organizationId, then POST /auth/login), or Google (POST /auth/google-external with a Google ID token and this organizationId). Either way the answer carries a token the app sends as Authorization: Bearer on every App API call. registrationPolicy: \"open\", in at once; \"approval\", an organization admin approves each signup (TaskLite mails the admins on every signup, and the person once approved; unapproved users are never billed); \"invite\", a new person gets in only with an invite code (create_app_invite, or a code a user of the app minted on a relation endpoint with allowInvites): the app sends it as inviteCode with POST /auth/otp/verify, /auth/register-external or /auth/google-external, a sign-up without one is refused with 403 INVITE_REQUIRED and a bad code with 403 INVITE_INVALID, while people who are already members keep signing in as before; \"closed\" (the default), self-signup refused, external users are created by an admin. Under every policy a valid invite code admits its holder as if the organization were open, so \"invite\" is the policy for an app where people join only through someone who invited them (a coach inviting trainees). appLoginUrl: the page of YOUR app where these users log in, it becomes the \"Log in\" button in the approval email, so set it whenever you deploy an app that uses this flow; pass \"\" to clear. Call with no changes to just read the current settings. Requires organization admin.", + "description": "Read or change how EXTERNAL users (people who sign up to your app through TaskLite auth) get into an organization. This policy governs sign-up by email and password and by Google. Sign-in by a phone code (POST /auth/otp/send, then /auth/otp/verify) obeys only \"invite\": under \"closed\", \"approval\" and \"open\" any phone that verifies a code becomes an external member of the organization, who reaches nothing until an endpoint's row-level security or the app's access list (add_app_user) gives them something; under \"invite\" a new phone needs an invite code or an add_app_user grant. The two ways in that obey the whole policy: email and password (POST /auth/register-external with this organizationId, then POST /auth/login), or Google (POST /auth/google-external with a Google ID token and this organizationId). Either way the answer carries a token the app sends as Authorization: Bearer on every App API call. registrationPolicy: \"open\", in at once; \"approval\", an organization admin approves each signup (TaskLite mails the admins on every signup, and the person once approved; unapproved users are never billed); \"invite\", a new person gets in only with an invite code (create_app_invite, or a code a user of the app minted on a relation endpoint with allowInvites): the app sends it as inviteCode with POST /auth/otp/verify, /auth/register-external or /auth/google-external, a sign-up without one is refused with 403 INVITE_REQUIRED and a bad code with 403 INVITE_INVALID, while people who are already members keep signing in as before; \"closed\" (the default), self-signup refused, external users are created by an admin. Under every policy a valid invite code admits its holder as if the organization were open, so \"invite\" is the policy for an app where people join only through someone who invited them (a coach inviting trainees). appLoginUrl: the page of YOUR app where these users log in, it becomes the \"Log in\" button in the approval email, so set it whenever you deploy an app that uses this flow; pass \"\" to clear. Call with no changes to just read the current settings. Requires organization admin.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" },
--- pinned/create_app_endpoint +++ observed/create_app_endpoint { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (listed on it, or an owner/admin of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", + "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (on its access list, or an owner, admin or editor of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. Anyone else who signs in is refused with 403, so put the people who run the app on the list with add_app_user (their phone and a role; it works before their first sign-in). \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", "enum": [ "owner", "shared",
--- pinned/create_item +++ observed/create_item { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Status value (todo, in_progress, done, or a value from the board's status options)", + "description": "Task status of the row on a task board: todo, in_progress, review or done. Refused on a data board, where it would only write a hidden task field: set that board's status column with cells (create_item) or set_cell (update_item) instead", "type": "string" }, "tags": {
--- pinned/list_app_users +++ observed/list_app_users { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "List the end users of an app: everyone who ever called it with X-App-User or signed in to it with a code. Each has userId (the id link_app_user, list_app_user_links and send_test_push take), externalId (the developer's own id for them, or null for a user who signed in by code), name, source (api or otp), role (viewer, editor or submitter; editor when never set), isActive, lastSeenAt and itemCount (rows they own on the app's boards). Use it to find the userId of the person to link to a row.", + "description": "List the people of an app, as { users, pending }. users: everyone who ever called it with X-App-User or signed in to it with a code. Each has userId (the id set_app_user_role, remove_app_user, link_app_user, list_app_user_links and send_test_push take), externalId (the developer's own id for them, or null for a user who signed in by code), name, phone (the phone they proved with a code, or null), source (api or otp), role (viewer, editor or submitter), isActive, hasAccessRow, lastSeenAt and itemCount (rows they own on the app's boards). hasAccessRow says whether they are on the app's access list: when it is false, role and isActive are only defaults, and an endpoint in row-level security mode \"shared\" refuses them with 403 until add_app_user or set_app_user_role puts them on the list. pending: the phones add_app_user is still holding access for, each with id, phone, role, createdAt, expiresAt and status (pending, or expired); they get in on their first sign-in with a code. Use it to see who can use the app and to find the userId of a person.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" },
--- pinned/query_items +++ observed/query_items { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Only rows whose status is NOT one of these, comma separated, resolved like status. The way to ask for everything that is not done: excludeStatus \"done\" (task board) or \"Completed\" (a data board with that option). Rows with no status at all are kept", + "description": "Only rows whose status is NOT one of these, comma separated, resolved like status. The way to ask for everything that is not done: excludeStatus \"done\" (task board) or \"Completed\" (a data board with that option). Rows with no status at all are kept. A board without a status column is handled as for status: an error, or a filter here on a dropdown named status/סטטוס/מצב", "type": "string" }, "limit": { - "description": "Only rows whose status is one of these, comma separated. Matched against the board's status column by option value or label, case-insensitive: \"todo,in_progress\" on a task board, \"Received,In Repair\" on a data board whose status column lists those (get_board_schema shows the options)", + "description": "Only rows whose status is one of these, comma separated. Matched against the board's status column by option value or label, case-insensitive: \"todo,in_progress\" on a task board, \"Received,In Repair\" on a data board whose status column lists those (get_board_schema shows the options). Needs a status column. A board with none (no column of type status) gets an error that lists its dropdown columns, instead of unfiltered rows. A board whose status is a dropdown named status/סטטוס/מצב is filtered here on that dropdown, after fetching, so an explicit limit can give a page with fewer rows (the answer says so)", "type": "string" } },
+ tool added: remove_app_user
+ tool added: set_app_user_role
--- pinned/update_app_endpoint +++ observed/update_app_endpoint { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (listed on it, or an owner/admin of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", + "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (on its access list, or an owner, admin or editor of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. Anyone else who signs in is refused with 403, so put the people who run the app on the list with add_app_user (their phone and a role; it works before their first sign-in). \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", "enum": [ "owner", "shared",
--- pinned/update_item +++ observed/update_item { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Update item fields (title, description, status, priority, dueDate, tags).", + "description": "Update item fields (title, description, status, priority, dueDate, tags). On a data board the task fields (status, priority, dueDate, tags) are hidden: its columns, status included, are set with set_cell.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" }, - "description": "Status value (todo, in_progress, done, or a value from the board's status options)", + "description": "Task status of the row on a task board: todo, in_progress, review or done. Refused on a data board, where it would only write a hidden task field: set that board's status column with cells (create_item) or set_cell (update_item) instead", "type": "string" }, "tags": {
Changed 2026-10-09 13:23 UTC
4 descriptions rewritten, 2 schema or annotation changes with the description left byte-identical, 10 tools added.
--- pinned/build_backend +++ observed/build_backend { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Build a whole backend in one call from a spec you compose: the project, its boards, their typed columns (including relations between the boards), optional sample rows, and optionally a published REST API with one endpoint per board and a server-side key. Use it whenever the user describes a system (\"a backend for my repair shop: customers, orders, payments\") instead of calling create_project, create_board, create_column, create_app, publish_app, create_app_endpoint and create_app_api_key one by one. You do the design, pick column types by meaning (phone, date, currency, dropdown/status with options for closed choices), link boards with a relation column (type \"relation\", relatedBoard: \"<board name in this spec>\", relationType: many_to_one for an order→customer link), and this tool executes it and returns one compact summary. API field names are derived from column names and never collide with reserved item fields, so there is nothing to retry. Boards are created as plain data tables (kind \"data\": only the columns you define, no task fields); set kind \"tasks\" on a board where people track work to do and want status, priority, assignee and due date built in. Every row still has a title.", + "description": "Build a whole backend in one call from a spec you compose: the project, its boards, their typed columns (including relations between the boards), optional sample rows, and optionally a published REST API with one endpoint per board and a server-side key. Use it whenever the user describes a system (\"a backend for my repair shop: customers, orders, payments\") instead of calling create_project, create_board, create_column, create_app, publish_app, create_app_endpoint and create_app_api_key one by one. You do the design, pick column types by meaning (phone, date, currency, dropdown/status with options for closed choices), link boards with a relation column (type \"relation\", relatedBoard: \"<board name in this spec>\", relationType: many_to_one for an order→customer link), and this tool executes it and returns one compact summary. API field names are derived from column names and never collide with reserved item fields, so there is nothing to retry. Boards are created as plain data tables (kind \"data\": only the columns you define, no task fields); set kind \"tasks\" on a board where people track work to do and want status, priority, assignee and due date built in. Every row still has a title. When the API has its own users, api.rowLevelSecurity: true gives every endpoint mode \"owner\"; a board may carry its own rowLevelSecurity instead (mode shared, phone or relation, with columns named as in this spec), e.g. Coaches { mode: \"phone\", phoneColumn: \"Phone\" } and Trainees { mode: \"relation\", relationColumn: \"Coach\", identityPhoneColumn: \"Phone\", allowInvites: true }.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" }, - "description": "true when the app has its own users and each may see only their rows (the caller then sends X-App-User)", + "description": "true when the app has its own users and each may see only their rows (the caller then sends X-App-User): every endpoint gets mode \"owner\", except a board that carries its own rowLevelSecurity. For shared, phone or relation modes set rowLevelSecurity on the board itself", "type": "boolean" } }, + "rowLevelSecurity": { + "additionalProperties": false, + "description": "Row-level security of this board's endpoint, used only when \"api\" is given; overrides api.rowLevelSecurity for this board. Columns are given by NAME as written in this spec (the ids do not exist yet). Only the keys listed here exist; an unknown key is refused, not ignored", + "properties": { + "allowInvites": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, default false: true lets a user of the app mint an invite code for a row they reach through this endpoint (POST /apps/{appSlug}/api/{endpointSlug}/{itemId}/invites with body { maxUses?, expiresInDays?, label? }; the endpoint must also allow POST). A coach invites a trainee to the trainee's own row; whoever signs up with the code is linked to that row. Such an invite never grants an access role. Without it only an owner or admin creates invites (create_app_invite)", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "editOwnOnly": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, default false: true lets everyone the relation reaches READ a row, while only the user who created it may PATCH or DELETE it, or change its files (others get 403 with code ROW_NOT_YOURS). For rows two people both see but only one of them owns, e.g. a trainee's own log that her coach reads", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "emailColumn": { + "description": "mode \"phone\" only, optional, next to phoneColumn: a column that holds each row's email. A user whose email was proved by a login code also reaches the rows that carry that address; for people whose number takes no SMS (outside Israel the code goes by email, which proves the email, not the phone). The NAME of a column of this board in the spec", + "type": "string" + }, + "enabled": { + "description": "Defaults to true; false leaves this endpoint without row-level security", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "identityEmailColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, optional: like identityPhoneColumn, for an email column and a user whose email was verified by a login code. The NAME of a column of that board in the spec", + "type": "string" + }, + "identityPhoneColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, optional: a phone column on the board where the caller's own items live (the board relationColumn points to, or with viaColumn the board viaColumn points to). A user whose VERIFIED phone (sign-in by a code sent to that phone) is written in a row there stands for that row, with no invite and no link. Example: Coaches.\"Phone\", so a coach who signed in by phone is his own Coaches row at once. Whoever may write that column decides who the row is, so expose it readOnly wherever it must not move. The NAME of a column of that board in the spec", + "type": "string" + }, + "mode": { + "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (listed on it, or an owner/admin of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", + "enum": [ + "owner", + "shared", + "phone", + "relation" + ], + "type": "string" + }, + "phoneColumn": { + "description": "mode \"phone\" only, required there: the column that holds each row's phone number. The NAME of a column of this board in the spec", + "type": "string" + }, + "relationColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, required there: a RELATION column on this endpoint's board. A row belongs to the caller when this column points at an item that stands for the caller (or, with viaColumn, at an item that points at one). Example: on the Trainees board, the \"Coach\" column. The NAME of a relation column of this board in the spec", + "type": "string" + }, + "singleLink": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, default false: true gives each row of this endpoint's board to ONE linked user. Once someone is linked to a row, another person redeeming an invite code for the same row is refused (the sign-up answers inviteRedeemed: false with inviteError \"INVITE_ROW_TAKEN\"), so a coach cannot become a trainee's row from a second account. Whoever is already linked is not affected, and the app owner can still link by hand (link_app_user). Set it on the endpoint of the board whose rows are invited to, e.g. Trainees", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "viaColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, optional: one more hop. A RELATION column on the board that relationColumn points to, leading to the board of the caller's own items. Example: a Weigh-ins endpoint with relationColumn = Weigh-ins.\"Trainee\" and viaColumn = Trainees.\"Coach\" lets a coach reach the weigh-ins of all his trainees. For the trainee herself, make a second endpoint on the same board with relationColumn = \"Trainee\" and no viaColumn. The NAME of a relation column of the board relationColumn points to", + "type": "string" + } + }, + "type": "object" + }, "rows": { "description": "Optional sample rows keyed by column name, e.g. [{ \"Customer\": \"Sam Miller\", \"Phone\": \"052-555-0142\", \"Price\": 80 }]. \"title\" sets the row title; without it the first plain text value is used, and failing that the row is named after its board and position. A row that other boards reference must carry a title (or a text value) so the reference can be resolved. A relation cell takes the title(s) of rows in the related board (any order in the spec; rows are created in dependency order).", "items": {
+ tool added: check_invite_code
+ tool added: configure_app_settings
--- pinned/configure_external_access +++ observed/configure_external_access { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Read or change how EXTERNAL users (people who sign up to your app through TaskLite auth) get into an organization. They have two ways in, and both obey the policy below: email and password (POST /auth/register-external with this organizationId, then POST /auth/login), or Google (POST /auth/google-external with a Google ID token and this organizationId). Either way the answer carries a token the app sends as Authorization: Bearer on every App API call. registrationPolicy: \"open\", in at once; \"approval\", an organization admin approves each signup (TaskLite mails the admins on every signup, and the person once approved; unapproved users are never billed); \"closed\", invite only, self-signup refused. appLoginUrl: the page of YOUR app where these users log in, it becomes the \"Log in\" button in the approval email, so set it whenever you deploy an app that uses this flow; pass \"\" to clear. Call with no changes to just read the current settings. Requires organization admin.", + "description": "Read or change how EXTERNAL users (people who sign up to your app through TaskLite auth) get into an organization. They have two ways in, and both obey the policy below: email and password (POST /auth/register-external with this organizationId, then POST /auth/login), or Google (POST /auth/google-external with a Google ID token and this organizationId). Either way the answer carries a token the app sends as Authorization: Bearer on every App API call. registrationPolicy: \"open\", in at once; \"approval\", an organization admin approves each signup (TaskLite mails the admins on every signup, and the person once approved; unapproved users are never billed); \"invite\", a new person gets in only with an invite code (create_app_invite, or a code a user of the app minted on a relation endpoint with allowInvites): the app sends it as inviteCode with POST /auth/otp/verify, /auth/register-external or /auth/google-external, a sign-up without one is refused with 403 INVITE_REQUIRED and a bad code with 403 INVITE_INVALID, while people who are already members keep signing in as before; \"closed\" (the default), self-signup refused, external users are created by an admin. Under every policy a valid invite code admits its holder as if the organization were open, so \"invite\" is the policy for an app where people join only through someone who invited them (a coach inviting trainees). appLoginUrl: the page of YOUR app where these users log in, it becomes the \"Log in\" button in the approval email, so set it whenever you deploy an app that uses this flow; pass \"\" to clear. Call with no changes to just read the current settings. Requires organization admin.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" }, - "description": "How external sign-ups are admitted: open, approval or closed", + "description": "How external sign-ups are admitted: open, approval, invite (only with an invite code) or closed", "enum": [ "closed", "approval", - "open" + "open", + "invite" ], "type": "string" }
--- pinned/create_app_endpoint +++ observed/create_app_endpoint { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Expose a board as a REST endpoint of an app: /apps/{appSlug}/api/{slug}. exposedColumns limits which columns are readable/writable. rowLevelSecurity.enabled makes the endpoint per-user: the developer's server sends `X-App-User: <their user id>` next to the API key, and the endpoint returns, updates and deletes ONLY that user's rows (401 without the header). Use it whenever the app has its own users.", + "description": "Expose a board as a REST endpoint of an app: /apps/{appSlug}/api/{slug}. exposedColumns limits which columns are readable/writable. rowLevelSecurity.enabled makes the endpoint per-user: the developer's server sends `X-App-User: <their user id>` next to the API key, and the endpoint returns, updates and deletes ONLY that user's rows (401 without the header). Use it whenever the app has its own users. rowLevelSecurity.mode chooses which rows a user reaches: owner (the rows they created), shared (all rows, for authorized users), phone (the rows that carry their verified phone) or relation (the rows linked through a relation column to the row that stands for them). An app with two kinds of people in one organization, coaches and their trainees, is built from these: the Coaches board in mode phone (phoneColumn = its phone column), so each coach reads and edits his own row; Trainees in mode relation with relationColumn = its Coach column and identityPhoneColumn = the Coaches phone column, so a coach who signed in by phone sees only his trainees; boards one hop further (weigh-ins of a trainee) in mode relation with relationColumn = the Trainee column and viaColumn = Trainees.Coach for the coach, plus a second endpoint on the same board without viaColumn for the trainee herself. A trainee becomes her row through an invite code (create_app_invite, or allowInvites so the coach mints it in the app) or link_app_user.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" }, - "description": "Row-level security. Off: whoever holds the app key reads everything. On: every request must name a signed-in user, and mode decides which rows they reach", + "description": "Row-level security. Off: whoever holds the app key reads everything. On: every request must name a signed-in user, and mode decides which rows they reach. Only the keys listed here exist; an unknown key is refused, not ignored", "properties": { + "allowInvites": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, default false: true lets a user of the app mint an invite code for a row they reach through this endpoint (POST /apps/{appSlug}/api/{endpointSlug}/{itemId}/invites with body { maxUses?, expiresInDays?, label? }; the endpoint must also allow POST). A coach invites a trainee to the trainee's own row; whoever signs up with the code is linked to that row. Such an invite never grants an access role. Without it only an owner or admin creates invites (create_app_invite)", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "editOwnOnly": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, default false: true lets everyone the relation reaches READ a row, while only the user who created it may PATCH or DELETE it, or change its files (others get 403 with code ROW_NOT_YOURS). For rows two people both see but only one of them owns, e.g. a trainee's own log that her coach reads", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "emailColumn": { + "description": "mode \"phone\" only, optional, next to phoneColumn: a column that holds each row's email. A user whose email was proved by a login code also reaches the rows that carry that address; for people whose number takes no SMS (outside Israel the code goes by email, which proves the email, not the phone). A column id (get_board_schema)", + "type": "string" + }, "enabled": { "description": "true: every request must carry a signed-in user (the token from sign-in, or the app key with X-App-User)", "type": "boolean" + "identityEmailColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, optional: like identityPhoneColumn, for an email column and a user whose email was verified by a login code. A column id (get_board_schema of that board)", + "type": "string" + }, + "identityPhoneColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, optional: a phone column on the board where the caller's own items live (the board relationColumn points to, or with viaColumn the board viaColumn points to). A user whose VERIFIED phone (sign-in by a code sent to that phone) is written in a row there stands for that row, with no invite and no link. Example: Coaches.\"Phone\", so a coach who signed in by phone is his own Coaches row at once. Whoever may write that column decides who the row is, so expose it readOnly wherever it must not move. A column id (get_board_schema of that board)", + "type": "string" + }, "mode": { - "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (listed on it, or an owner/admin of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card", + "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (listed on it, or an owner/admin of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", "enum": [ "owner", "shared", - "phone" + "phone", + "relation" ], "type": "string" }, - "description": "mode \"phone\" only: id of the column that holds each row's phone number (get_board_schema)", + "description": "mode \"phone\" only, required there: the column that holds each row's phone number. A column id (get_board_schema)", "type": "string" + }, + "relationColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, required there: a RELATION column on this endpoint's board. A row belongs to the caller when this column points at an item that stands for the caller (or, with viaColumn, at an item that points at one). Example: on the Trainees board, the \"Coach\" column. A column id (get_board_schema)", + "type": "string" + }, + "singleLink": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, default false: true gives each row of this endpoint's board to ONE linked user. Once someone is linked to a row, another person redeeming an invite code for the same row is refused (the sign-up answers inviteRedeemed: false with inviteError \"INVITE_ROW_TAKEN\"), so a coach cannot become a trainee's row from a second account. Whoever is already linked is not affected, and the app owner can still link by hand (link_app_user). Set it on the endpoint of the board whose rows are invited to, e.g. Trainees", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "viaColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, optional: one more hop. A RELATION column on the board that relationColumn points to, leading to the board of the caller's own items. Example: a Weigh-ins endpoint with relationColumn = Weigh-ins.\"Trainee\" and viaColumn = Trainees.\"Coach\" lets a coach reach the weigh-ins of all his trainees. For the trainee herself, make a second endpoint on the same board with relationColumn = \"Trainee\" and no viaColumn. A column id (get_board_schema of that other board)", + "type": "string" } }, "required": [
+ tool added: create_app_invite
--- pinned/create_automation +++ observed/create_automation { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "Create an automation on a board: when something happens, do something. The most useful action here is http_request, which calls an external API and writes the answer back into columns, pair it with the \"scheduled\" trigger and the board keeps itself up to date (prices, exchange rates, shipment status, weather). Triggers: item_created, status_changed, column_value_changed, date_approaching, scheduled. Actions: http_request, send_notification, send_email, change_status, set_column_value, create_cross_board_item, send_webhook. Two more things every action list can use: a { type: \"delay\", config: { minutes | hours | days } } action pauses the run and resumes the actions after it later (reminders, follow-ups); and any network action (http_request, send_webhook, send_email, send_whatsapp) may carry config.retry: { attempts (1-5), delaySeconds (1-60) }. send_webhook accepts config.secret for an HMAC signature. create_cross_board_item copies a new row to another board: config { targetBoardId, title?: \"{{item.title}}\", columnValues: { \"<column id on the TARGET board>\": \"{{<column NAME on this board>}}\" } }; there is no mapping field, and a column left out is not copied. To act only on some rows pass conditions, e.g. [{ field: \"<column id on this board>\", operator: \"equals\", value: \"New seller\" }]. Change an automation later with update_automation; call list_automations first so you do not add a second one that does the same thing.", + "description": "Create an automation on a board: when something happens, do something. The most useful action here is http_request, which calls an external API and writes the answer back into columns, pair it with the \"scheduled\" trigger and the board keeps itself up to date (prices, exchange rates, shipment status, weather). Triggers: item_created, status_changed, column_value_changed, date_approaching, scheduled. Actions: http_request, send_notification, send_email, send_push, change_status, set_column_value, create_cross_board_item, send_webhook. The scheduled trigger has no cron expression: the server checks once an hour, and triggerConfig takes { intervalHours, runAtHour } only (intervalHours: at least this many hours between runs, default 24; runAtHour: 0-23, run only during that hour of the day in UTC, not in the user's time zone, so convert: 08:00 in Israel is runAtHour 5 in summer and 6 in winter). A scheduled run executes the actions once for every row of the board that passes conditions, so filter with conditions. send_push sends a notification to the phones of app users through the app's own Firebase project (set up once per app: push_status; try it with send_test_push). Its config: { title, body, data, userIds, recipientsFromRelation, includeRowOwner, sound, badge, dataOnly }. title and body take {{column name}} placeholders, title defaults to the row title. Recipients are the union of: the row's owner under row-level security (includeRowOwner, default true; false leaves them out), userIds (fixed user ids, as in list_app_users), and recipientsFromRelation, a dotted path of column NAMES such as \"Client.Coach.Coach user\" that walks relation columns from this row and whose LAST segment must be a people column holding user ids (a single segment is a people column on this board); it does not resolve the user linked to a row by an invite or by phone, so without such a people column use userIds or the row owner. data is a flat object of strings the app reads to decide where to open (itemId and boardId are added). sound: \"default\" or the file name of a sound bundled in the app; badge: 0 to 99999, 0 clears; dataOnly: true shows nothing and delivers only data (no title, body, sound or badge; iOS may throttle or drop it). With no recipient the action is skipped, not failed. Two more things every action list can use: a { type: \"delay\", config: { minutes | hours | days } } action pauses the run and resumes the actions after it later (reminders, follow-ups); and any network action (http_request, send_webhook, send_email, send_whatsapp) may carry config.retry: { attempts (1-5), delaySeconds (1-60) }. send_webhook accepts config.secret for an HMAC signature. create_cross_board_item copies a new row to another board: config { targetBoardId, title?: \"{{item.title}}\", columnValues: { \"<column id on the TARGET board>\": \"{{<column NAME on this board>}}\" } }; there is no mapping field, and a column left out is not copied. To act only on some rows pass conditions, e.g. [{ field: \"<column id on this board>\", operator: \"equals\", value: \"New seller\" }]. Change an automation later with update_automation; call list_automations first so you do not add a second one that does the same thing.", "execution": { "taskSupport": "forbidden" }, - "description": "Action-specific config, e.g. { url, method, headers, responseMapping } for http_request", + "description": "Action-specific config, e.g. { url, method, headers, responseMapping } for http_request, or { title, body, recipientsFromRelation, includeRowOwner, userIds, data, sound, badge, dataOnly } for send_push", "type": "object" }, "type": { - "description": "Column type: text, rich_text, number, status, date, datetime, duration, people, checkbox, dropdown, label, priority, link, email, phone, relation, lookup, rollup, rating, currency, file", + "description": "Action type: http_request, send_notification, send_email, send_push, change_status, set_column_value, create_cross_board_item, send_webhook, send_whatsapp, delay", "type": "string" } }, - "description": "Event that starts the automation: item_created, status_changed, column_value_changed, date_approaching, or scheduled (cron)", + "description": "Event that starts the automation: item_created, status_changed, column_value_changed, date_approaching, or scheduled (checked hourly; an interval in hours and an optional hour of the day in UTC, not a cron expression)", "enum": [ "item_created", "status_changed", - "description": "e.g. { cron: \"0 8 * * *\" } for scheduled, { columnName } for column_value_changed", + "description": "For scheduled: { intervalHours?: number (default 24), runAtHour?: 0-23 in UTC }, e.g. { intervalHours: 1 } for every hour, or { runAtHour: 5, intervalHours: 23 } for once a day at 05:00 UTC. The interval is measured from the previous run, which ends a little after the hour, so with runAtHour use 23, not 24: with 24 the next day's check falls just short and the run slips a day. A cron field is not read. For column_value_changed: { columnName }", "type": "object" } },
+ tool added: delete_app_endpoint
+ tool added: link_app_user
+ tool added: list_app_invites
+ tool added: list_app_user_links
+ tool added: list_app_users
+ tool added: revoke_app_invite
+ tool added: unlink_app_user
--- pinned/update_app_endpoint +++ observed/update_app_endpoint { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, + "allowInvites": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, default false: true lets a user of the app mint an invite code for a row they reach through this endpoint (POST /apps/{appSlug}/api/{endpointSlug}/{itemId}/invites with body { maxUses?, expiresInDays?, label? }; the endpoint must also allow POST). A coach invites a trainee to the trainee's own row; whoever signs up with the code is linked to that row. Such an invite never grants an access role. Without it only an owner or admin creates invites (create_app_invite)", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "editOwnOnly": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, default false: true lets everyone the relation reaches READ a row, while only the user who created it may PATCH or DELETE it, or change its files (others get 403 with code ROW_NOT_YOURS). For rows two people both see but only one of them owns, e.g. a trainee's own log that her coach reads", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "emailColumn": { + "description": "mode \"phone\" only, optional, next to phoneColumn: a column that holds each row's email. A user whose email was proved by a login code also reaches the rows that carry that address; for people whose number takes no SMS (outside Israel the code goes by email, which proves the email, not the phone). A column id (get_board_schema)", + "type": "string" + }, "enabled": { "description": "true: every request must carry a signed-in user (the token from sign-in, or the app key with X-App-User)", "type": "boolean" + "identityEmailColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, optional: like identityPhoneColumn, for an email column and a user whose email was verified by a login code. A column id (get_board_schema of that board)", + "type": "string" + }, + "identityPhoneColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, optional: a phone column on the board where the caller's own items live (the board relationColumn points to, or with viaColumn the board viaColumn points to). A user whose VERIFIED phone (sign-in by a code sent to that phone) is written in a row there stands for that row, with no invite and no link. Example: Coaches.\"Phone\", so a coach who signed in by phone is his own Coaches row at once. Whoever may write that column decides who the row is, so expose it readOnly wherever it must not move. A column id (get_board_schema of that board)", + "type": "string" + }, "mode": { - "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (listed on it, or an owner/admin of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card", + "description": "\"owner\" (default): each user sees and edits only the rows they created. \"shared\": every user authorized on the app (listed on it, or an owner/admin of the organization) sees and edits every row; the mode for an admin screen or a team system. \"phone\": a user signed in with a code sent to their phone sees and edits only the rows whose phoneColumn holds that phone, e.g. a directory where each person keeps their own card, or the Coaches board itself in a coaching app (each coach reads and edits his own row; a POST writes his verified phone into the row whatever the body says). \"relation\": each user reaches the rows whose relationColumn points at the row that stands for them, e.g. a Trainees board whose \"Coach\" relation column points at the Coaches board: a coach sees only his trainees. A relation endpoint never returns the row that IS the user, only rows pointing at it, so expose the identity board itself through a second endpoint in mode \"phone\". In relation mode a new row is linked to the caller by the server, the link cannot be moved with PATCH, and a user who stands for no row gets an empty list on GET and 403 on POST", "enum": [ "owner", "shared", - "phone" + "phone", + "relation" ], "type": "string" }, - "description": "mode \"phone\" only: id of the column that holds each row's phone number (get_board_schema)", + "description": "mode \"phone\" only, required there: the column that holds each row's phone number. A column id (get_board_schema)", "type": "string" + }, + "relationColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, required there: a RELATION column on this endpoint's board. A row belongs to the caller when this column points at an item that stands for the caller (or, with viaColumn, at an item that points at one). Example: on the Trainees board, the \"Coach\" column. A column id (get_board_schema)", + "type": "string" + }, + "singleLink": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, default false: true gives each row of this endpoint's board to ONE linked user. Once someone is linked to a row, another person redeeming an invite code for the same row is refused (the sign-up answers inviteRedeemed: false with inviteError \"INVITE_ROW_TAKEN\"), so a coach cannot become a trainee's row from a second account. Whoever is already linked is not affected, and the app owner can still link by hand (link_app_user). Set it on the endpoint of the board whose rows are invited to, e.g. Trainees", + "type": "boolean" + }, + "viaColumn": { + "description": "mode \"relation\" only, optional: one more hop. A RELATION column on the board that relationColumn points to, leading to the board of the caller's own items. Example: a Weigh-ins endpoint with relationColumn = Weigh-ins.\"Trainee\" and viaColumn = Trainees.\"Coach\" lets a coach reach the weigh-ins of all his trainees. For the trainee herself, make a second endpoint on the same board with relationColumn = \"Trainee\" and no viaColumn. A column id (get_board_schema of that other board)", + "type": "string" } }, "required": [ - "description": "Replacement row-level security (same shape as create_app_endpoint); null turns it off" + "description": "Replacement row-level security (same shape as create_app_endpoint); null turns it off. The object replaces the stored one whole, it is not merged: to change one field, read the current value with list_app_endpoints and send every field again (enabled, mode and the columns of that mode), or the ones left out are lost" }, "slug": { "description": "URL slug: lowercase letters, digits and dashes",
--- pinned/update_automation +++ observed/update_automation { "annotations": { "destructiveHint": false, - "description": "New trigger config", + "description": "New trigger config, same shape as in create_automation (scheduled: { intervalHours, runAtHour in UTC }, no cron)", "type": "object" } },
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